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Abstract 
 
In the Northern Territory, Australia, ballot papers for territory elections depict 
candidates’ photographs. We exploit this unusual electoral feature by looking at the 
effect that candidates’ beauty and skin color has on voting patterns. Our results for 
beauty are mixed, but we find strong evidence that skin color matters. In electorates 
with a small Indigenous population, lighter-skinned candidates receive more votes, 
while in electorates with a high number of Indigenous people, darker-skinned 
candidates are rewarded at the ballot box. The relationship between skin color and 
electoral performance is stronger for challengers than incumbents. We explain this 
with a model in which voters use skin color as a proxy for some underlying 
characteristic which they value only to the extent that they share the trait. 
 
 
 
JEL Codes: D72, J45, J71 
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1. Introduction 
 
It has long been recognized that voters make decisions based on limited information. 
As Matsusaka (2005) observes, ‘decades of survey research have shown that most 
voters are uninformed to the point of ignorance about public policy, politics and 
government in general’.1 Lacking a comprehensive knowledge of political issues, 
electors frequently use rules of thumb, or ‘information shortcuts’; extrapolating from 
limited information to make a decision. 
 
In this paper, we look at the effect of an unusual cue: ballot paper photographs. 
Specifically, we look at the extent to which candidates’ beauty and skin color are 
related to voter behavior. Other things equal, the presence of photographs on the 
ballot paper should increase the salience of this cue for voter decisions. 
 
To test for the effects of skin color and beauty on voting, we take advantage of a 
unique dataset. For territory elections in the Northern Territory, Australia, 
photographs of candidates are published on the ballot paper, adjacent to their names. 
Such ballot papers are unique within Australia, and – so far as we are aware – the 
developed world. They therefore provide us with an opportunity to learn more about 
the extent to which voter behavior is associated with the facial characteristics of 
candidates. 
 
To preview our findings, we observe that in elections where candidates’ photographs 
appear on the ballot paper, more attractive candidates are more likely to win. 
However, the aspect of the candidate’s appearance that matters most is not beauty, but 
skin color.  In electorates with a large share of Indigenous voters, candidates with 
darker skin receive more votes, while in electorates with a small share of Indigenous 
voters, having lighter skin brings a larger electoral benefit.  
 
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple theoretical model of 
candidate cues and discusses the relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the political 
                                                            
1 Other studies looking at voting when individuals have limited information include Lupia (1994), Aidt 
(2000), and Caplan (2007). The limited-information model appears to apply well to Australia. In the 
2004 Australian Election Study, only 12 percent of respondents agreed strongly with the statement ‘I 
feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing Australia’.  
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context and data used in our study. Section 4 presents results, and the final section 
concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Model of Candidate Cues 
 
To begin, it is useful to outline a simple theoretical model of the way in which 
candidate characteristics might affect voter behavior. Let Uij be the utility received by 
voter i in supporting candidate j. Now suppose that this is a function of two candidate 
characteristics. The first characteristic, Xj, is a trait that is universally liked. The 
second, Zj, is a voter-dependent characteristic, meaning that it is liked by voters who 
share it, but disliked by voters who do not share it. Formally: 
 
Uij=F(Xj, ZjZi)        (1) 
 
Now suppose that we normalize the share of the population who have trait Zi to have a 
mean of zero, and the share of candidates who have trait Zj to also have a mean of 
zero. Assuming that the distributions of Zi and Zj are symmetrical, then if the median 
voter theorem holds:  
 
dUij/dXj ≥ 0        (2) 
dUij/dZjZi ≥ 0 
 
Such a simple typology of candidate cues can be used to separate many of the 
standard findings on voter behavior. A candidate characteristic that is universally 
liked (Xj) might be personal integrity, experience, and intelligence. A candidate 
characteristic (Zj) that interacts with a voter characteristic (Zi) might be income (e.g. 
rich voters prefer rich candidates, poor voters prefer poor candidates) or ideology (e.g. 
left-wing voters prefer left-wing candidates, right-wing voters prefer right-wing 
candidates).  
 
Now suppose that instead of directly observing Xj and Zj, voters instead observe noisy 
signals, xj and zj, such that: 
 
xj = Xj + εj        (3) 
3 
 
zj = Zj + μj        (4) 
 
Assuming that εj and μj are mean-zero, normally distributed disturbance terms, these 
noisy signals of voter traits (xj and zj) will be positively correlated with voters’ utility. 
 
dUij/dxj ≥ 0        (5) 
dUij/dzjZi ≥ 0 
 
It is important to note that our model does not assume that voters are rational, in the 
sense that they cast their ballot with the aim of bringing about a particular political 
outcome. Although our model is quite consistent with rational voter models, it also 
accords with models of expressive voting, in which constituents do not expect their 
vote to have any impact on the election result (see e.g. Brennan and Lomasky 1993). 
 
In this paper, we focus on two such noisy signals – candidate beauty and candidate 
skin color. Drawing on prior face attractiveness literature, we expect that candidate 
beauty will be a universally liked trait. Psychological evidence has shown that facial 
features are one of the initial bases for categorical judgments (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
In a meta-analysis of 919 studies, Langlois et al. (2000) find that attractive children 
and adults are judged more positively than unattractive people, and are also treated 
more positively.2 This finding appears to be robust across countries, cultures, and 
contexts, including in elections. Attractive candidates have been shown to win more 
votes in elections to the national parliaments of Australia (King and Leigh 2006), 
Finland (Berggren, Jordahl and Poutvaara 2006) and Germany (Klein and Rosar 
2005). In the US, candidates whose faces were judged to be more competent won 
more votes in actual elections (Todorov et al 2005). Better-looking candidates are also 
more likely to win elections to become an officer of the American Economic 
Association (Hamermesh 2006) and a member of a British community board 
(Banducci et al. 2003).  
 
By contrast, we expect that candidate skin color will be a voter-dependent trait. As in 
the deep south of the United States, the Northern Territory is a jurisdiction where 
                                                            
2 Recent beauty studies in the psychological literature include Rhodes (2006) and Wilson and Eckel 
(2006). 
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racial politics have typically been important (Worthington 2001; Jaensch 2002; Goot 
2006). We therefore expect that Indigenous voters will prefer candidates who support 
extending land rights and benefits to the Indigenous community, while non-
Indigenous voters will tend to oppose such candidates. Voters who do not know a 
particular candidate’s position on these issues may instead use skin color as a proxy 
for policy positioning and as an indication of whether a candidate belongs to an in-
group rather than an out-group.3 
 
Face processing literature speaks of the substantial difference in the psychological and 
neural processing of same-race faces versus other-race faces (Phelps and Thomas 
2002; Eberhardt 2005). Perhaps the most relevant finding here is that attention to race 
seems to occur automatically even in the very early stage of face processing (Golby et 
al. 2001). Most existing evidence indicates that voters are more likely to support 
candidates who are like themselves on some salient dimension, such as gender or race. 
Polling evidence has shown that voters used candidates’ gender and race as a cue to 
policy positions (McDermott 1998). Experimental studies with college students also 
demonstrated that voters’ choices were affected by similarities of gender and race 
(Adams 1975; Sigelman and Sigelman 1982). Among white participants, an 
experimental study showed that even when policy positions were held constant, 
darker-skinned African-American candidates were less favored than lighter-skinned 
African-American candidates (Terkildsen 1993). Outside the laboratory, police 
(Donohue and Levitt 2001; Antonovics and Knight 2004), basketball referees (Price 
and Wolfers 2007), and employers making hiring or promotion decisions (Stoll, 
Raphael, and Holzer 2004; Stauffer and Buckley 2005) have been found to treat those 
of a different race more harshly than those of their own race.4 
 
However, we should not overlook the possibility that skin color – like beauty – could 
be a universally liked trait. There is some laboratory evidence supporting this view. 
                                                            
3 For a thorough analysis of the biological determinants of skin color, see Jablonski (2006). 
4 Another literature finds that among minority groups in the US, lighter-skinned workers earn higher 
wages. This appears to hold true for African-Americans (Goldsmith, Hamilton and Darity 2006, 2007; 
see also Hersch 2006), Mexican-Americans (Mason 2004), and new immigrants (Hersch 2008) (we are 
not aware of any studies that have analyzed the relationship between skin color and wages in 
Australia). However, this does not necessarily speak to the question of whether there is an interaction 
between the skin color of the employer and the employee, since the wage studies do not contain 
information on the employer’s skin color. Given that most employers are white, their preferences are 
likely to overwhelm those of non-white employers in any empirical analysis. 
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Maddox and Gray (2002) presented photographs of light-skinned and dark-skinned 
African-Americans to black and white college students. They found that among both 
black and white experimental subjects, images of lighter-skinned people were judged 
more positively across a number of traits. Similarly, Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald 
(2002) found that both black and white participants in an Implicit Association Test 
showed a subconscious bias towards white faces over black faces. However, we are 
not aware of any evidence that these biases – to the extent that they exist – lead blacks 
to favor whites when making conscious choices. Our interpretation of the evidence is 
that when making a conscious decision (such as casting a ballot, making an arrest, or 
hiring a new worker) both blacks and whites tend to exhibit a same-race preference. 
Our study can be regarded as a further test of this hypothesis.  
 
An important point to note about our empirical strategy is that we analyze results not 
at the individual level, but at the electoral level. Although we will tend to interpret our 
results as indicative of individual-level patterns, it is nonetheless possible that our 
results are driven by unobserved factors that are correlated with the individual 
demographics in our dataset (the so-called ‘ecological fallacy’ problem).  
 
3. Institutional Context and Data 
 
Our data in this paper are drawn from the Northern Territory election held on 18 June 
2005. The Northern Territory has a unicameral parliament, with 25 seats in the 
Legislative Assembly. In the previous election (held in 2001), the centre-left 
Australian Labor Party had won office for the first time since the Northern Territory 
attained self-government in 1978. In the 2005 election, the Australian Labor Party 
further increased its majority, winning 19 of the 25 seats.  
 
Although voting is compulsory (and failure to vote was punishable by a fine of $110 
in the 2005 election), turnout in Northern Territory elections has always been 
relatively low (Shepheard 2005, 17). This is due partly to the region’s low population 
density. In the 2005 election, 89,646 people voted, which equated to 80 percent of 
those on the electoral roll. Four percent of the votes cast were informal, so our sample 
consists of 86,288 votes. Although Northern Territory elections use a preferential 
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voting system, we do not exploit this feature of the data, since our focus is on a 
voter’s most favored candidate.  
 
As discussed above, an unusual feature of Northern Territory elections is that 
candidates’ photographs appear on the ballot paper. Under the Electoral Act (NT 
2004) and Electoral Regulations (NT 2004), all candidates are required to submit a 
black and white, full-faced vertical portrait of the nominee's head and shoulders, taken 
within 6 months before lodgment of the nomination. The 2005 election was not the 
first Northern Territory election in which candidates’ photographs were on the ballot5, 
but it was the first Northern Territory election in which ballots had shown both 
photographs and party names. 
 
Our voting data are drawn from the website of the Northern Territory Electoral 
Office, which publishes the number of votes received by each candidate, and 
demographic profiles of each electorate. These demographic profiles are based upon 
data from the 2001 Australian Census, matched to the electoral boundaries as they 
were for the 2005 election. The profiles provide information on several characteristics 
of the electorate, including the share of the population that self-identifies as 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander. 
 
Ballot papers were supplied to us in electronic form by Bill Shepheard, the Northern 
Territory Electoral Commissioner. Following a determination from the Northern 
Territory Information Commissioner that electoral ballots are not public documents, 
Mr Shepheard sought permission for us to use the ballot papers, by contacting agents 
for all political parties who ran candidates, and directly contacting all independent 
candidates. Only one candidate (an independent who ran in the division of Nightcliff) 
denied permission, and that candidate is excluded from our results. Our dataset 
therefore contains information on 79 of the 80 candidates who ran for election in 
2005.  
                                                            
5 The history of ballot photos in the Northern Territory dates back to the 1980 election. The photos 
were initially introduced as a part of an integrative effort to simplify voting procedure. Specifically, the 
photos were intended to assist voters with low level of literacy and voters who need significant help 
from others in casting their vote (Jaensch and Loveday 1981). Adding photographs to the ballot paper 
was associated with a 2% increase in turnout (from 75.9% in 1977 to 77.9% in 1980), but no noticeable 
change in the rate of informal voting. 
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Figure 1 shows a sample ballot paper from the 2005 election, for the seat of Arafura. 
 
 
Figure 1: A Sample Ballot Paper from the 2005 Northern Territory Election 
 
We coded five characteristics of candidates. The first three characteristics were 
candidates’ gender, political party, and whether they were the incumbent. These were 
based upon data from the Northern Territory Electoral Office, supplemented by 
incumbency information from the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly. In the 
case where a local member had just retired, none of the candidates were coded as 
incumbents. 
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The fourth characteristic we coded was candidates’ beauty. This was done by 
compiling the ballot photographs of the 79 candidates into a 2-page PDF document. 
We gave the following instruction to our raters: 
 
 “Please rate the attractiveness of each face on a 1 to 9 scale (1 = least 
attractive, 9 = most attractive). Try to use the scale optimally and maintain an 
average of 5.” 
 
To accommodate both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous population in the Northern 
Territory, and also to be representative of the gender and age of the Australian 
electorate in general, our raters were a 24 year-old Indigenous male, a 39 year-old 
Indigenous female, a 24 year-old non-Indigenous female, and a 40 year-old non-
Indigenous male. None of the raters were familiar with any of the photographs, thus 
ruling out possible rating contamination due to other accessible proxies (e.g. 
familiarity), and ensure that the rating was solely based on direct assessment of 
physical beauty itself. The rating process took each rater about half an hour (i.e. about 
20 seconds per photograph). The raters were compensated with A$20 book vouchers. 
 
Table 1: Inter-Rater Beauty Correlations
 IM24 IF39 NIF24 NIM40 
IM24 (μ = 5.114) 1    
IF39 (μ = 4.645) 0.585 1   
NIF24 (μ = 5.088) 0.600 0.472 1  
NIM40 (μ = 4.696) 0.462 0.458 0.460 1 
Note: Sample size is 79. All correlations are significant at 1% level. IM24 is a 24 year-old Indigenous 
male, IF39 is a 39 year-old Indigenous female, NIF24 is a 24 year-old non-Indigenous female, and 
NIM40 is a 40 year-old non-Indigenous male. μ is the mean beauty rating for each rater.  
 
The pairwise correlations between ratings are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the 
correlations between the four raters are uniformly moderate to high, ranging from 
0.458 to 0.600.6 An important point here is that there is no substantial difference on 
beauty judgment between Indigenous and non-Indigenous raters, supporting the main 
                                                            
6 Four raters is about the modal number used in studies of the economics of beauty. The correlations 
between beauty raters in our study are also quite similar to other studies, such as King and Leigh 
(2006). Since the lowest correlations were with the 40 year-old non-Indigenous male, we also 
experimented with dropping his ratings. We found that the results were very similar if we used only the 
average of the three other raters. 
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finding of the beauty literature that people tend to have a general and reliable 
agreement over what constitutes beauty (Langlois et al. 2000, Rhodes 2006).7  
 
The beauty measure we use in this paper aggregates the four raters’ beauty scores. 
This is done by rescaling each rater’s scores into a z-score (mean 0, standard deviation 
1), creating a new variable that is the mean of the four z-scores, and then rescaling 
this average so that it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
 
The fifth candidate characteristic we coded was skin color. This was done by one of 
the authors, using a 17-point scale that ran in even steps from white (0) to black (16). 
Figure 2 depicts this scale.8 In our sample, candidates’ skin color ranged from 1 to 11, 
with a mean of 3.4.  
 
Figure 2: Skin Coding Scale 
0  
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
6   
7   
8   
9   
10   
11   
12   
                                                            
7 We also experimented with breaking the sample into two groups: the 53 candidates whose skin color 
was rated 3 or lighter, and the 26 candidates whose skin color was rated 4 or darker (see Figure 2 for 
definitions of these numbers). We found that our raters tended to concur more on the ratings of darker-
skinned candidates (correlations from 0.707 to 0.765) than lighter-skinned candidates (correlations 
from 0.251 to 0.572). However, we still did not observe any systematic tendency for the ratings of our 
Indigenous raters to differ from the ratings of our non-Indigenous raters.  
8 Specifically, this 0-16 scale uses the following 17 html colors: FFFFFF, F0F0F0, E0E0E0, D0D0D0, 
C0C0C0, B0B0B0, A0A0A0, 909090, 808080, 707070, 606060, 505050, 404040, 303030, 202020, 
101010, 000000. 
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the 79 candidates in our sample. Across the 
sample, 28 percent of the candidates were incumbents, and 37 percent were women. 
32 percent represented the Australian Labor Party (ALP), 32 percent represented the 
Country Liberal Party (CLP), 14 percent represented the Greens, and the remainder 
were independents. On average, candidates received 32 percent of the vote. The 
average share of Indigenous voters in an electorate was 26 percent, though this was 
highly skewed (the median is 13 percent). Since both beauty and skin color are 
normalized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity, this has the advantage 
that regression coefficients for these variables can simply be interpreted as the 
marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in beauty/skin darkness.9 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics (N=79) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote share 0.316 0.218 0.011 0.761
Incumbent candidate 0.278 0.451 0.000 1.000
Party=ALP 0.316 0.468 0.000 1.000
Party=CLP 0.316 0.468 0.000 1.000
Party=Greens 0.139 0.348 0.000 1.000
Party=Independent 0.228 0.422 0.000 1.000
Female 0.367 0.485 0.000 1.000
Beauty (normalized) 0.000 1.000 -1.976 2.230
Skin color (0-16 scale) 3.418 2.245 1.000 11.000
Skin color (normalized) 0.000 1.000 -1.077 3.377
Share of Indigenous Voters 
in Electoral Division 0.262 0.262 0.047 0.843
 
 
4. Beauty, Skin Color and Vote Share 
 
                                                            
9 The correlation between beauty (averaged from four ratings) and skin color was -0.04 (ns). We also 
estimated the correlation separately for each rater. The correlations between beauty rating and skin 
color for IM24, IF39, NIF24, and NIM40 were 0.126 (ns), -0.033 (ns), -0.231 (significant at 5% level), 
and 0.021 (ns), respectively. We therefore conclude that there is no systematic relationship between 
beauty rating and skin color in our sample. 
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We begin by simply plotting the bivariate relationship between the key variables in 
the analysis. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between beauty and vote share 
separately for challengers and incumbents. For challengers, a one standard deviation 
increase is associated with a 6.5 percent increase in vote share, while for incumbents, 
beauty has no statistically significant impact on vote share. This is consistent with 
theories that suggest that beauty becomes less salient when voters have more 
information about a candidate, as is likely to be the case for incumbents.    
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Figure 3: Candidate Beauty and Vote Share
(vote share on vertical axis)
 
By contrast with our results for beauty, we observe no uniform pattern between the 
color of a candidate’s skin and their share of the vote across all electorates.10 This 
indicates that Northern Territory voters do not have a uniform preference for 
candidates with lighter or darker skin. However, it is possible that pooling the full 
sample is masking effects that run in opposite directions. Since the median Northern 
Territory electorate has 13.3 percent Indigenous voters, we separate electorates into 
two groups of approximately equal size – those in which less than 13 percent of the 
population are Indigenous, and those in which more than 13 percent of the population 
are Indigenous. For simplicity, we term these ‘Non-Indigenous Electorates’ and 
‘Indigenous Electorates’, respectively.  
                                                            
10 For challengers, the regression result is Vote share = 0.218 + 0.001*SkinColor (t=0.1) (N=57). For 
incumbents, the regression result is Vote share = 0.534 + 0.008*SkinColor (t=0.8) (N=22). 
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In Figure 4, we chart the relationship between a candidate’s skin color and their vote 
share separately for these two groups of electorates. Splitting the data in this manner 
reveals a very different pattern to that shown in the previous graph. Within Non-
Indigenous electorates, candidates with whiter skin receive more votes, while in 
Indigenous electorates, candidates with darker skin receive more votes. As with 
beauty, the relationship between skin color and electoral performance is stronger for 
challengers than incumbents. Across the four groups, the relationship between voting 
and skin color is strongest for challengers in Non-Indigenous electorates. 
 
Figure 4 also reveals another factor about Northern Territory politics: candidates with 
quite dark skin simply choose not to run in Non-Indigenous electorates. Of the eight 
candidates whose skin color was rated 7 or darker, all chose to run in Indigenous 
electorates. 
0
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Figure 4: Candidate Skin Color and Vote Share
(vote share on vertical axis)
 
To test these patterns more formally, we estimate regressions that take the form: 
 
Vjk = α + βxjk + γzjkEk + νjk      (6) 
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where Vjk is the vote share of candidate j running in electorate k, xjk is a noisy signal 
of a universally liked characteristic, zjk is a noisy signal of a voter-dependent 
characteristic, Ek is a characteristic of voters in electorate k, and νjk is a normally-
distributed mean-zero error term. To take account of the fact that votes in each 
electorate must sum up to 100 percent, standard errors are clustered at the electorate 
level. 
 
Table 3 shows the results from these regressions. All specifications control for 
incumbency (which has a positive and significant effect on vote share) and whether 
the candidate is female (the coefficient is negative but insignificant). Without party 
fixed-effects (column 1), a one standard deviation increase in beauty boosts a 
candidate’s share of the vote by 6.1 percentage points. This is a substantial impact – 
using the same specification, King and Leigh (2006) find a coefficient of 2.2 
percentage points for candidates in national elections. However, as column 2 shows, 
the beauty effect in Northern Territory elections is not robust to the inclusion of party 
fixed-effects.11  
 
Column 3 shows the results from including a variable in the regression measuring the 
darkness of a candidate’s skin. This is then interacted with the share of voters in an 
electorate who are Indigenous. The main effect is significant and negative, while the 
interaction is significant and positive. These results are robust to the inclusion of party 
fixed-effects (column 4), to controlling for candidate beauty (column 5), and to 
interacting candidate beauty with the Indigenous share (column 6).12  
 
Our preferred specification is column 4 (party fixed-effects but no controls for 
candidate beauty). In this column, the coefficient on Skin Darkness is -0.059, and the 
coefficient on Skin Darkness * Share Indigenous is 0.114. Both are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level or better.  
 
                                                            
11 We also experimented with coding the photographs in other ways, but found that factors such as 
facial expression were not strongly correlated with a candidate’s share of the vote.  
12 We obtain very similar results if the skin color variable is measured relative to other candidates 
running in the same electorate. 
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Table 3: Beauty and Skin Color Effects 
Dependent Variable: Vote share 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Beauty (normalized) 0.061*** 0.006   0.012 -0.005 
 [0.019] [0.014]   [0.013] [0.016] 
Beauty * Share 
Indigenous      0.050 
      [0.042] 
Skin Darkness 
(normalized)   -0.070* -0.059** -0.063** -0.064** 
   [0.036] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
Skin Darkness * Share 
Indigenous   0.156** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 
   [0.072] [0.039] [0.039] [0.037] 
Incumbent Candidate 0.321*** 0.223*** 0.337*** 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
 [0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
Female -0.035 -0.011 -0.008 -0.025 -0.035 -0.04 
 [0.049] [0.024] [0.047] [0.027] [0.028] [0.030] 
Share Indigenous   0.008 0.013 0.017 0.018 
   [0.088] [0.044] [0.047] [0.046] 
Party Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.56 0.85 0.54 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
To see what these magnitudes imply, note that the share of the population who are 
Indigenous in Northern Territory electoral divisions ranges from 5 to 84 percent. The 
above coefficients imply that in the least Indigenous electorate, a one standard 
deviation increase in skin darkness would lower a candidate’s vote share by 5.3 
percent, while in the most Indigenous electorate, a one standard deviation increase in 
skin darkness would raise a candidate’s vote share by 3.7 percent.  
 
The fact that political parties do not run darker-skinned candidates in non-Indigenous 
electorates suggests that they may be aware of these patterns. Evidence of this comes 
from the 2001 election (the previous election to the one we analyze here), in which 
the CLP ran both an Indigenous and a non-Indigenous candidate in the 68 percent 
Indigenous seat of MacDonnell, successfully holding the seat.13 However, it is also 
possible that in electorates with few Indigenous voters, there are also few potential 
candidates with dark skin. In this event, the bias would arise from the racial 
composition of the electorate, rather than strategic decisions by the political parties. 
                                                            
13 According to Worthington (2001), this tactic was also used by both the ALP and the CLP in the 1977 
election for the seat of Tiwi (an election in which candidate photographs were not depicted on the 
ballot paper). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The theoretical model posited in this paper separates candidate characteristics into two 
types: those that are universally liked, and those that are voter-dependent, meaning 
that they are liked only by those who share them. However, in our model, these traits 
are not directly observed by voters; they merely observe a noisy proxy. 
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on candidates’ facial features. Using data from 
elections in the Northern Territory, we code two aspects of candidates’ facial features 
– their beauty, and their skin color. Although the effect of beauty on electoral 
outcomes has been studied before, we are not aware of any other study that has looked 
at the impact of skin color in an actual election.  
 
Consistent with earlier studies, we find evidence that beauty is positively associated 
with candidates’ vote share (though the beauty effect is not robust to the inclusion of 
party fixed-effects). However, we find that the effect of skin color on vote share 
depends strongly upon the size of the Indigenous population in the electorate. The 
relationship between skin color and electoral performance is stronger for challengers 
than incumbents. This is consistent with beauty being a proxy for universally liked 
traits, and skin color being a proxy for voter-dependent traits.  
 
It should be noted, however, that our finding is inconclusive regarding the issue of 
whether voters take skin color as a cue of group membership or as an inherently 
desirable characteristic. This issue is beyond the scope of our dataset. One way in 
which future research may be able to solve the issue is by systematically 
distinguishing candidates’ policies from their skin color (e.g. a randomized trial in 
which half the experimental subjects had campaign materials and a photograph of the 
candidate; while the other had only the photograph). If skin color is a preferred 
characteristic of itself, then the availability of candidates’ policies should have no 
effect on the observed relationship between skin color and vote share. But if skin 
color is used as an indicator of group membership when other information is not 
available, then voters who have access to candidates’ policies – thereby have more 
direct information of the candidate’s group membership – would discard skin color as 
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a cue. In this latter case, the relationship between skin color and vote share would be 
affected by policy positioning. 
 
Since we only observe results from one election, we cannot determine whether the 
relationship between vote share and skin color in Northern Territory elections is 
stronger than it would be in the absence of ballot photographs. However, the effects of 
skin color on voting behavior in the Northern Territory are very strong, and it seems 
likely that skin color would be less salient in the absence of ballot photographs.  
 
However, removing ballot photographs could have disadvantages. Given that the 
Northern Territory has the lowest literacy levels in Australia, the absence of ballot 
photographs would be likely to increase voter error. In addition, the removal of 
photographs from the ballot paper might decrease voter turnout. These factors would 
have to be weighed against any possible benefits from decreasing the salience of race 
in Northern Territory elections. 
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